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I- INTRODUCTION
Previous to the enactment of the "Privacy Act of 1974", the
main thrust of computer literature was toward the depth to
which the laws of this country should regulate personal
information processed by computers and the extent to which
individual privacy needed to be safeguarded. It is not
unusual to obtain a copy of one of the many "horror stories"
associated with computers or to see a comic of an
individual's life being threatened by the invalid,
inaccurate information in a computer. What was not
emphasized, however, is that the machine itself is not the
villain: the processing of the contents of that machine by
human beings is the crux of the issue.
The purpose of this thesis is to discuss some of the
more recent issues on individual privacy and security
related to the Computer Industry today and determine exactly
what computer professionals should focus on to implement
today's legislation.
A basic definition of privacy and security will be
discussed along with the "Privacy Act of 1974" and its
implications toward computer operations. The influence of










Privacy is "the right of individuals, groups or
organizations to control the collection, use, or
dissemination of personal identifiable information." [24] In
another context, the meaning of privacy is the right to be
left alone. The former definition, most accepted in the
industry today, is assuredly less restrictive in nature
since it justifies record-keeping systems and disregards the
question raised by the latter of the right to gather any
personal information whatsoever.
Security is "the realization of protection for hardware,
software, and data." [24] In this sense, privacy therefore
implies protecting the individual whereas security protects
the organization. In order to maintain privacy, enforcement
of security is necessary. It is understood that one area
cannot be considered without overlapping into the other.
To establish clarity, the following definitions are
quoted from section 552(a) of the "Privacy Act of 1974".
[54]
The term 'agency' includes Federal agencies and those
government contractors who maintain a system of records to
accomplish a function of a Federal agency. Subdivisions of
an agency may be defined as agencies. It is determined by
the higher unit as to which of its components will be
subject to the Freedom of Information Act rather than the
Privacy Act. This practice of allowing flexible internal
compliance is intended to further the purpose of the acts,
not to defeat them. [49]

"The term 'individual* means a citizen of the United
States or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent
residence." [54]
The intention of this definition is to "distinguish
between the rights which are given to the citizen as an
individual under this Act and the rights of proprietorships,
businesses, and corporations which are not intended to be
covered by this Act. This distinction was to insure that
the bill leaves untouched the Federal Government's
information activities for such purposes as economic
regulations. This definition was also included to exempt
from the coverage of the bill intelligence files and data
banks devoted solely to foreign nationals or maintained by
the State Department, the Central Intelligence Agency and
other agencies for the purpose of dealing with nonresident
aliens and people in other countries." (Senate Report
93-1183, p. 79)
.
"The term 'maintain' includes maintain, collect, use, or
disseminate." [54] Within the Privacy Act, two connotations
of "maintain" are used: first, to denote the record keeping
actions which apply to the act; and second, control (not
necessarily physical custody) over, and thus responsibility
and accountability for record systems.
"The term 'record' means any item, collection, or
grouping of information about an individual that is
maintained by an agency, including, but not limited to, his
education, financial transactions, medical history, and
criminal or employment history and that contains his name,
or the identifying number, symbol, or other identifying
particular assigned to the individual, such as a finger or
voice print or a photograph." [54]

"A "record" :
- means any item of information about an individual that
includes an individual identifier;
- includes any grouping of such items of information (it
should not be confused with the use of the term record in
the conventional sense or as used in the automatic data
processing (ADP) community) ;
- does not distinguish between data and information;
both are within the scope of the definition; and
- includes individual identifiers in any form including,
but not limited to, finger prints, voice prints and
photographs." [49]
As is stated later, understanding this definition is
imperative in determining exactly which requirements of this
legislation apply to each computer system of records.
Record as used in the Privacy Act extends beyond the
conventional computer science context. It can include one
descriptor about an individual or many descriptors.
Therefore what is considered a data field or group of fields
in a computer record could be established as a record in the
legal sense. This means that a computer record could
consist of many legal records.
"The term 'system of records' means a group of any
records under the control of any agency from which
information is retrieved by the name of the individual or by
some identifying number, symbol, or other identifying
particular assigned to the individual. [54] The key phrase
in this definition is 'retrieved by'. Those records which
are not obtainable by use of a 'personal identifier' are
excluded from the act even though the possibility of using
the 'identifying particular* as a key field in record
retrieval exists. According to the Office of Management and
Budget (OMB) Guidelines, 'agencies' should consider two
10

factors in determining which systems are covered: "....its
ability to comply with the requirements of the Act and
facilitate the exercise of the rights of individuals; and
....the cost and convenience to the agency, but only to the
extent consistent with the first consideration." [49] Also,
section 552k (4) lists specific exceptions to those systems
of records covered by the Act.
"The term 'statistical record 1 means a record in a
system of records maintained for statistical research or
reporting purposes only and not used in whole or in part in
making any determination about an identifiable individual,
except as provided by section 8 of title 13." [54]
"A "statistical record", for purposes of this Act, is a
record in a system of records that is not used by anyone in
making any determination about an individual. Phis means
that, for a record to qualify as a "statistical record", it
must be held in a system which is separated from systems
(some perhaps containing the same information) which contain
records that are used in any manner in making decisions
about the rights, benefits, or entitlements of an
identifiable individual, The term "identifiable individual"
is used to distinguish determinations about specific
individuals from determinations about aggregates of
individuals as, for example, census data are used to
apportion funds on the basis of population.
By this definition, it appears that some so-called
"research records" which are only used for analytic purposes
qualify as "statistical records" under the Act if they are
not used in making determinations. A "determination" is
defined as "any decision affecting the individual which is
in whole or in part based on information contained in the
record and which is made by any person or any agency."
(House Report 93-1416, p. 15.)
11

Most of the records of the Bureau of the Census are
considered to be "statistical records" even though, pursuant
to section 8 of title 13, United States Code, the Census
Bureau is authorized to "furnish transcripts of census
records for genealogical and other proper purposes and to
make special statistical surveys from census data for a fee
upon reguest." (House report 93-1416, p. 12)
In applying this definition, it might be helpful to
distinguish three types of collections or groupings of
information about individuals: (1) statistical compilations
which, because they cannot be identified with individuals,
are not subject to the Act at all; (2) "records" maintained
solely for the purpose of compiling statistics - which are
the types of records covered by section 552(a) (6) of the
Privacy Act; and (3) "records" on individuals which are used
both to compile statistics and also for other purposes, e.g.
a criminal history record used both to compile individual
statistics and to assist a judge in making a sentencing
decision about the individual to whom the record pertains,
which is not a "statistical record." [49]
"The term 'routine use 1 means, with respect to the
disclosure of a record, the use of such record for a purpose
which is compatible with the purpose for waich it was
collected." [54]
B. LEGISLATION
In legislating, the right of privacy must be balanced
against equally valid public interests in freedom of




On the international level, there have been three
approaches to the regulation of privacy:
1. Administrative self-regulation which was employed by
the British.
2. Omnibus licensing and regulation, the approach of
Sweden and Germany.
3. An area-by-area provision of court enforceable citizen
rights which is the American viewpoint.
The British "Data Surveillance Bill of 1969" establishes
a Registrar to keep a register of all data banks, public and
private. This register contains details of the data kept by
the data bank, the person responsible for the dat bank, the
purpose for which data may be used, and by whom. The
register is subject to both public and private inspections.
Under this bill, each person shall receive a printout of the
data stored about himself including the purpose for which it
is used when the data bank is established.
Afterward, for a fee the individual may obtain a
printout of the data, their purposes and a listing of all
the recipients of such data. If an individual desires to
remove inaccurate, unfair or out of date information, he may
apply for an order to remove such data and all recipients
are notified. The law further states that each operator of
a data bank is liable for damages when he permits inaccurate
data to be supplied which can be harmful to a person.
Punishable offenses include failure to accurately register a
data bank, use of the data for nonregistered purposes,
allowing access to persons other than those entered on the




Various West German States have passed data protection
acts that establish certain measures of control over
government files. Sweden, the first country to pass a law
on privacy, established a federal Data Inspection Board.
This organization requires the licensing of all commercial,
computer-operated record-keeping systems in accordance with
established government standards including conditions for
their operation. The board additionally provides advice on
the conduct of government data banks.
France has studied the problem, but has taken no
definitive action. The Department of Communication and
Justice in Canada has produced substantial studies and
recommendations on the issue of privacy, however, no
legislation has been passed at this time.
It is of special importance that Canada and the United
States be strengthened in the area of privacy regulation
because of the enormous number of privately owned American
companies headquartered in Canada and the United States.
Questions regarding the legal regulation and
restrictions on the private records of Canadian citizens
which are owned by American companies are still unanswered.
The concern over invasion of privacy has received
special attention in the United States as a result of
numerous developments, among which are the GSA proposal for
a comprehensive computer network which could store personal
information on file in several different Federal agencies,
and increasing use of the social security number as a
standard universal identifier.
Since policy conflicts arise, as in all government
legislation, two approaches are taken to resolve these
14

differences. The agency-by-agency resolution which imposes
upon each agency "....the responsibility for regulating
dissemination of personal data persuant to legislative
guidelines - including the duty to obtain first the written
consent of the subject." [32] This approach fixes
responsibilities, however, some agencies may have to expand
their own information collecting activities to obtain
directly from the subject what previously was obxained
indirectly from other agencies. The second approach
classifies and regulates programs and types of data systems.
"This approach relieves the burden on some agencies, but
would not distinguish the portions of such records which
could usefully and properly be disclosed". [32] A
combination of both approaches has been implicit in most
bills introduced in Congress, but the need for a study of
the proper balance of the values in conflict still arises.
One reason for this discord is that presently there is no
legal definition for privacy. It has been established,
however, that each individual's idea of privacy differs with
age, experience and environment.
The "Privacy Act of 1974" (P.L. 93-579) amends Chapter 5
of Title 5 of the United States Code (section 552a) . It
applies to U.S. Federal Government Agencies and private
contractors who are performing a record-keeping service for
a Federal agency and is based on the 1973 report by the
Committee on Personal Data Systems of the Department of
Health, Education and Welfare entitled "Records, Computers
and the Rights of Citizens". [55] This landmark in computer
history created a set of standards for the collection,
maintenance, use and dissemination of personal information
in both manual and automated systems. The initial report
contained a set of 'fair information practices'.
The purpose of the Code of Fair Information Practices
was to define the desired behavior of a data bank, the
15

desired relation between the data subject and the data bank,
and to establish certain rights for each citizen. Each of
the five basic principles was incorporated into the Privacy
Act
:
1. There must be no personal data record-keeping system
whose very existence is secret.
2. There must be a way for an individual to find out
what information about him is in a record and how it is
used.
3. There must be a way for an individual to prevent
information about him that was obtained for one purpose from
being used or made available for other purposes without his
consent.
4. There must be a way for an individual to correct or
amend a record of identifiable information about him.
5. Any organization creating, maintaining, using or
disseminating records of identifiable personal data must
assure the reliability of the data for their intended use
and must take precautions to prevent misuse of data. [55]
These principles as incorporated in the Privacy Act
(section 552(b)) include the permitting of exceptions to the
Act when determined by specific statutory authority.
1. Provisions are provided which require the
publication of an annual notice in the Federal Register and
public notice of changes to existing systems of records as
well as new systems.
2. Any individual is permitted to view and receive a
copy of any record containing personal information about him
16

in those systems covered by the Act exclusive of exempt
disclosures. He may also see an accounting of his record to
determine how the information in it has been used.
3. Unless prior written consent has been obtained from
an individual, all Federal agencies are prohibited from
disclosing information unless its use is consistent with the
original intent of the collection of such information.
4. The Privacy Act specifies procedures which must be
implemented by the agencies to allow an individual the
possibility of amending or changing his record.
Additionally, it requires that said agencies must review
initial refusals to amend such records and state the reason
for this action.
5. All subject records used by an agency which
maintains the system of records shall insure their accuracy,
relevance, timeliness and completeness "as is reasonably
necessary to assure fairness to the individual." [54] These
agencies are to implement administrative, technical and
physical safeguards "to insure security and confidentiality
of records. " [ 10
]
Additionally, the Privacy Act clearly states that
responsibility for effective personal information systems
and integrity and accuracy of the data which comprise them,
rests with those individuals who manage and employ such




II. EFFECT ON COMPUTER SYSTEMS
In section 552e of the Privacy Act, certain requirements
are listed for each agency to fulfill. To implement these
conditions, the Office of Management and Budget Privacy Act
Guidelines of July 1, 1975 have been created to further
explain the measures to be enacted. Since it is the
responsibility of the personnel who maintain the record
systems covered by the Privacy Act to insure the accuracy
and integrity of personal information, certain procedures
should be established and fulfilled to comply with this
legislation. Although, it is beyond the scope of this
discussion to list precisely what must be accomplished in
each computer installation, those measures applicable to all
situations will be mentioned. By studying the installation
and establishing the objectives and goals to be attained in
specific circumstances, an efficient review and plan of
action can be developed with the least amount of effort.
A. MANAGEMENT CONSIDERATIONS
The first consideration is to decide which systems of
records are covered under the Privacy Act. This may seem a
simple task: however, due to the vague and complex
definition in the law, serious thought and study should be
spent on this decision. This leads to the necessity of a
manager knowing the current legislation. (The Privacy Act
and OMB Guidelines are in the forefront today. Among other
pertinent literature is the Freedom of Information Act and
H.R.1984). Realizing that not all managers have the time to
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read the legislation, nor the legal expertise necessary to
understand all the implications or details, the need for
education arises. An alternative approach would be to
appoint individuals knowledgeable in both fields, law and
computer science, to study the situation and present a
summary (in layman's terms) available to all computer
installations. This would not only save much time and avoid
unnecessary complications, but would be an excellent mode of
educating a vast number of computer professionals in a short
time. It is inevitable that private industry will be
affected within the next three years and the need for rapid
understanding is mandatory. Various states have legislation
already in effect.
There are measures to protect computer professionals
which can be accoraplihed before more legislation goes into
effect. The Association for Computing Machinery has
suggested rules of conduct for personnel in the computer
industry. These guidelines cover three categories of
professional conduct: relations with the public, relations
with employer and clients, and relations with other
professionals.
To insure a high quality of personnel, it is desirable
to establish similiar standards throughout the profession.
Other approaches, previously mentioned in literature, have
been licensing or bonding of personnel and certification.
By insuring the competence and integrity of personnel, the
installation thus increases protection against illegal
activities, intentional or not, and decreases the threat of
internal subversion. These standards must continue to
demand high quality work. This means accuracy of data.
More will be said of this in later sections. In addition to
the personnel, assurance of adequate physical protection
should be established. The National Bureau of Standards and
the Association of Computing Machinery have published
19

security checklists as guides in determining proper security
at each installation. [24,46] These are excellent starting
points in planning the protection of an organization
regardless of the age or style of the computer equipment.
Questions applicable to all phases of computer technology
will be found in these references.
Presently, there is some level of security at all
installations. Controlled personnel access to the computer
is an important factor in maintaining secure operations.
There are various ways to attain restricted entrance. The
point here is to consider who has the authority to obtain
admission to the facility and how difficult it is for an
unauthorized individual to achieve access. The next step is
to determine which method to use and to what degree, if any,
restricted access is necessary. The computer environment
should not be overlooked in deciding how to implement
protection measures. The location of the facility and the
building in which it is housed, if poorly guarded and
constructed, may lead to infiltration and destruction of
personal information or other valuable files. Thus computer
personnel could be accused of negligence and appropriate
penalties would be awarded.
Once the overall physical environment has been analysed
and appropriate decisions made as to what action, if any, is
required, the computer equipment and software should be
evaluated for compliance. After a final review of the
equipment and support facilities, the final step is to
provide for future analysis, otherwise known as periodic
auditing. There are various methods for accomplishing a
reevaluation of existing systems. One of the most effective
being management by exception. This does not preclude the
possibility of other less important factors influencing the
quality of an efficient system, but rather aids in
20

establishing which attributes most significantly hamper
computer operations and implementation of objectives.
Before concluding this portion of the discussion, a
remark on costs should be included. Those elements which
must be weighed in management of computer facilities all
contribute to some degree to the cost of compliance. The
basic question to be resolved is which action should be
taken at a reasonable expense. If every computer
installation takes a passive role toward the legal
implications and responsibilities set forth by government,
have the efforts of individuals to maintain their right to
privacy and their right to have accurate facts pertaining to
their lives contained in these machines been for nought?
Does this attitude reflect the typical manager's
position is this an enhancement or hindrance to the
computer profession? Should every manager wait until the
other organization is penalized or should he use the prudent
man approach? It is suggested that each computer facility
review its operations and procedures, then a decision as to
what degree of compliance is necessary would be made tc the
benefit of the entire community.
B. DATA : ACCURACY AND FLOW
This section will discuss those factors which influence
how data is collected and what factors affect the quality of
exactness achieved in information retrieval. The various
methods employed in data collection have a commonality of
factors which influence the degree of accuracy attained in
initial accummula tion . The nature of the data may cause
unavoidable error. For example, if the specific numeric,
alphabetic or special characters are written in an
undecipherable penmanship it is left to the descretion of
21

the individual who enters that data into the computer system
as to whether it is correct or not. This is not to say
mistaken data is intentionally created, but obviously the
need for validation arises. Which validation procedure is
implemented is the decision of those personnel responsible
for data accuracy. Analysis of input data should include
whether or not a particular item is still necessary for the
purpose for which it was intended. If the data is no longer
required, it should be deleted from the input procedures.
Retention of data for longer than needed could also cause
harm to individuals. There is no standard time for
determining when this information is obsolete as this
depends on the status of its function, i.e. if this purpose
was satisfied, or the age of the information causes it to be
unreliable, or if its only value is historical. Other
elements involved in error control and collection include
the authority for assembling the data, who does the actual
collection and why. Not to be missed is the source of the
data. If the data collected is not correct initially, error
checking at the computer center level may not be effective.
The legal implication, of course, is: Who is responsible,
the individual who inserted false data or those who maintain
it?
The legislative view is to assume a relationship of
trustworthiness between the data subject and the receiver of
the information. If the individual for whatever motive,
enters false data into the system, how does the computer
industry protect itself against lawsuits for invalid data?
Idealistically , this situation would never arise.
Realistically, protection of both parties should be
established.
The form which contains the data should be examined for
clarity and readability. A poorly designed document can
lead to errors by the most well-intentioned procedure. If
22

that data is not inscribed directly into the system, such as
from a terminal, are the initial forms (source documents)
which contain that information carelessly discarded or is
some procedure implemented to insure those documents do not
reach unauthorized personnel?
This leads to protection of the data once it has been
entered into the system. Determinations as to the
possibility cf maintaining dedicated systems for personal
information files could lead to excessive costs and
management adversity. This approach could be justified by
the stringent requirements of security and the threat to
individual privacy. The costs of maintaining a separate
system and losing the benefits of a shared data base are
factors which should be weighed in this decision.
Integrating data into a data base may not be the problem if
th€ elements (identifying particulars) have no purpose in
being in that specific data base at all. The sensitivity of
the personal data may vary thereby lending itself to levels
of classification. Since the legislation may cause
problems, existing record structure needs to be examined for
legal records to establish what data fields may have to be
changed to conform to the legal requirements. The mixing of
the different sensitivity levels of data and sensitivity
transience have created the need for reevaluation at the
data field level. Presently, the technological approaches
to store mixed levels of data either use an increased amount
of storage or an immense amount of time. The existing
technology for file structures does not have a simplified
solution to this situation. The idea of simple aggregation
of data such as statistical information has been suggested
to alleviate this problem. The intent is that having a
large number of records, even with certain sensitive
elements contained in the record, will be sufficient to
eliminate the threat of harm to an individual. One method
is to input individual items, compute aggregate ( averages,
23

etc ) , then destroy inputs. This is adequate if the
organization only needs aggregates. Obviously, if the
sensitive information is still in the data base after
aggregation, no protection has been afforded. This 'safety
in numbers' attitude could be a simple method to employ, but
does not insure that an unauthorized individual is prevented
from obtaining the information in the files. Even if the
sensitive information was given some serial number and cross
referenced on another higher level file, this does not
preclude the possibility of unauthorized access to the
personal information.
Software utilities may alter or delete personal
information. This action substantiates the need for
establishing a check of existing programs for compliance
with the current legislation. If unintentional
modifications to legal records occur, further errors are
created. The programs required to process the information
should not increase fallacy in the process and decrease data
integrity. By refusing to evaluate current software, the
threat of individual harm persists. Checks to include
privacy compliance in new programs should be added to
current standards. This insures continued protection of
individual rights and data integrity. Operating systems
have been studied and designed around security, but existing
systems are net totally immune to illegal penetration. To
consistently patch holes and use the retrofit approach
certainly does not insure unauthorized access and may create
new paths of entry.
It is a fact in our industry that a software approach to
insuring security of files is only as effective as the
hardware in which it is stored. Faulty machinery which
loses bits of data creates errors. Proper preventative
maintenance aids in maintaining a secure system. The
eavesdropping or "bugging" of electronic devices is
24

presently being researched. New methods of eliminating
electronic fallout are being tryed and possible solutions
exist in the near future. Currently, however, the problem
still exists. What are the legal implications if personal
information is obtained in this manner? How is one to
provide for protection of personal information if current
technology has net advanced to the degree of furnishing a
solution? Are the responsibilities of the computer industry
to perhaps revert to simpler methods of processing
information by eliminating third generation equipment and
networks? This question, although harsh, is to point oat
the need for legislative personnel and computer personnel to
work together in solving data processing problems. To
formulate realistic legislation toward computer processing
entails careful deliberation on all phases of the industry
coupled with the rights of the individual at a reasonable
expense to all.
Once the information has been generated, procedures for
insuring proper safeguards for output should be maintained.
Legal restrictions and verification of reports, tapes,
cards, etc, for 'routine use* and 'the purpose for which
originally intended' pose a problem of revising production
procedures. The same possibilities of unintentional
disclosure exist as with original input. Certain
precautions may include changing the output class so that
computer operators may administratively provide a more
secure environment for the output. For example, running
those printouts only at certain times and allowing only the
individual who submitted the job to receive the output or
re-locating a printer to a more restricted area where only
authorized personnel would see the information. If
carelessly discarded output is not destroyed, and
unauthorized uses result, legally it is the responsibility




'•Physical security measures are the firsts line of
defense against: the risks which stem from the uncertainties
in the environment as well as from the unpredictability of
human behavior." [46] Computer architecture is not designed
to fully eliminate the ability to obtain access to data
through unauthorized methods. Some devices for insuring
protection include memory protection schemes such as
relocation and bounds registers, segmentation, paging and
memory keys which allow limited access i.e. read-only.
Error-detecting circuits and codes check almost all hardware
errors in the computer. The problem of insuring privacy of
data from a hardware standpoint includes those older
machines which do not have current technological features
incorporated into their structure and the retrofit solution
has not been successful in resolving illegal penetration.
Regarding networks, the greatest potential of a break in
security lies in the telecommunications line. Electronic
emanations are the greatest threat. As stated previously,
solutions to this problei are being studied and a workable
result is expected soon. [47]
1 • 9£££§£in£L System
The third-generation computer with operating systems
or master control programs have, generally, two modes of
operation: supervisor (system) and problem (user). The
supervisor mode enables one to execute priviledged
instructions. These instructions include changing the state
of the computer, starting input/output processors, changing
protection rights of parts of the computer and altering the
interrupt status of the machine. Obviously, one who has
access to the supervisor mode for a specific computer has
26

access to any and all data associated with that computer.
Previous cases of a user, intentionally or not, entering the
supervisor state for harmful reasons have been recorded.
One solution to avoiding this situation has been the
•patchwork' approach. When one "hole" was patched, another
was created thereby initiating a more complex path to
achieving the goal of illegally retrieving data. The
procedures to insure that the supervisor mode is not
obtained through illegal methods have so far not proven
totally successful.
The storage protection mechanism in the operating
system is a major factor in safeguarding personal data. Not
only does it affect computer performance, but if not
properly implemented and controlled, sensitive data could
become available to an unauthorized user. "Common
protection mechanisms are checks on logical addresses or on
physical addresses. The logical address check consists of a
segment base containing the actual address and the segment
length. The physical address protection employs separate
key-to-lock mechanisms." [24] The proper utilization of this
mechanism coupled with limited read-only or write-only
access to the programs and data within the computer decrease
a possibility of alteration and access to personal data and
increase compliance with present legislation. Limiting
access to the master control program or operating system is
another obvious safeguard to be employed.
2 . ?S£iE]l^£§.i D evic es
Consideration of direct access storage devices and
tape drives includes the methods of erasing erroneous or
out-of-date data contained on the medium. Therefore to
insure security, writing over the entry could be
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accomplished through hardware control while disconnected
from the data channel. This method is preferred over the
use of the operating system for this purpose since the
latter may involve too many system services and extreme
overhead
.
Tape drives can best be protected through
administrative procedures. The tape labeling process is
easily bypassed and in some cases access to the data tape is
obtained by merely requesting the tape be mounted. One
proposed solution is to color code specific devices which
contain personal information to easily determine the legal
requirement for special protection. With regard to
input/output devices, current designs are not adequately
secure. Teleprocessing equipment provides the greatest
threat of harm. In terminal systems, the need to identify
the operator and terminal is real and valid. The solutions
here vary from password to keyword voice spectro-analysis
.
In some cases sign-ons are accomplished through hardware
control.
Fcr unit record devices, limited access to the media
and data through administrative measures is one solution.
Error checking codes, i.e., parity and cyclic checking must
be required for data protection; and logic circuit
redundance is necessary in the core critical hardware
circuitry.
D. SOFTWARE CONSIDERATIONS
Certain administrative procedures for software have been
mentioned. It is the purpose of this section to discuss the




The solutions mentioned in literature for software
security have been costly and not necessarily realistic for
the computer installation. For example, placing an
indicator in each "legal record" has been suggested. This
however requires space which may not be available and would
require lengthening a computer record which may already be
using all its allocated space. In older computer systems,
storage techniques and programming are not as versatile as
in newer systems and this implies obtaining a new computer
system. Certainly this is not an easy task or decision.
There are various types of attacks involving software
which have been categorized by the Air Force Panel on
Technology and Planning. [3]
"In the case of implied sharing, the supervisor shares
some of its work space with the problem programs.
Therefore, the problem program is free to access such
resources as the catalog, and buffers in which proprietary
information is kept. For example, the supervisor reads the
security profile (the list of system data sets and user
passwords) into the user's area to authenticate the user
that is requesting access to a particular data set (date
file) . However, because the information remaining in the
shared area (the user's area) and has not been overwritten,
the current user now has access to other users' passwords."
[24]
ObviousLy, the solution is to eliminate both supervisor
and problem mode using the same work space. This means
redesigning the operating system. If the system includes
checks for location and use of the supervisor and insures
the space has been overwritten before assigning it to a
problem program then this threat is eliminated. This of
course delays use of system resources. The implication is
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certainly net to be taken lightly there is no thoroughly
secure system.
"In the case of scavenging, the word space is not shared
by the user's program, but neither is it cleared after being
used by the supervisor. Therefore, if the user has access
to it, he could gain access to sensitive information like
passwords and authorization levels. Another type of
scavenging exists in the area of data management. On a
direct access device, the system can allocate space for a
file and then fill that file with sensitive data. When that
file is deleted, its space may not be cleared by the system.
Therefore, when another user program gains control, the
system could allocate that same space to the user so it is
possible for him to read it and gain access to sensitive
information that was left there previously. Temporary files
used in the course of a job that contained sensitive data
could also be candidates for scavenging." [24]
To clear the workspace before it is used by the next job
would eliminate this type of attack. Technologically, this
problem has been solved and should not be a factor in larger
systems. In smaller, less sophisticated computer systems,
the flexibility of the operating system is limited and
stricter administrative controls and procedures are used.
"Incomplete parameter checking is a major weakness of
contemporary operating systems that occurs at the interfaces
between the system and the users' programs. Users call
operating system functions in a manner similar to subroutine
calls, using many parameters. By supplying addresses outside
the space allocated to that user's program, three dangerous
results are possible:




2. A set of conditions can be generated to cause a system
crash.
3. Control may be returned to the user in supervisor
state." [24]
To assure control of the supervisor state is not gained
through this means requires redesign of the storage
protection mechanisms as well as limited access to those
addresses wherein the supervisor resides.
"The asychronous interrupt method exploits a combination
of poor system design and the handling of asynchronous
interrupts. For example, suppose a remote terminal user is
permitted two unsuccessful sign-ons before being terminated.
When the system is designed to handle an interrupt before
updating the counter used to limit this, unpredictable
results can occur.
The trojan horse class of attack is used in an attempt
to achieve the breakdown in security by introducing into the
operating system programs with security holes. When a hole
is activated, the "trojan horse" routine can be used to open
any user files and gain access to classified data. For
example, a software performance monitor, while evaluating a
program, can gather sensitive data associated with that
program.
The clandestine code change is a class of attack that is
closely related to the trojan horse attack. In this case,
system programmers could insert code into the system that
would form trapdoors. Indeed it is almost routine for
systems programmers to add such trapdoor code to current
operating systems for legitimate systems programming
purposes such as quick maintenance. At certain times and
based on certain combinations these trapdoors may be
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activated by a user from his program. This capability also
exists for the persons who initially design the system, or
for manufacturers who supply fixes to the system.
The asynchronous attack has often been referred to as
the time of check and time of use problem. When a user's
program parameters were originally checked by the supervisor
they were proper. But after the check and before their use,
the user changed them so as to circumvent some protection
feature of the system. This attack is possible because
third-generation computers are able to process input/output
and relinquish control back to the user for concurrent
processing." [24]
These threats involve a redesign of the operating system
and stricter security measures in software development.
Controlling user access to the supervisor mode is re -
emphasized. The creation of a security matrix for purposes
of deciding who has authorized access to which resources is
mandatory. The solutions to those threats as yet
unconguered rely on the technological community to provide
the answer.
Legally, the question still remains: if it is
technologically possible to gain access to personal
information and the state of the art has not conquered the
method of attack, who is liable? If the computer
installation has implemented all possible procedures to
avoid unauthorized access, are they still subject to
legislative penalties? The possibility of designing a
totally secure software operating system into existing
hardware is not realistic and would be extremely costly.
Therefore more reliable program design, acceptance testing
and standards is an alternative approach.
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Possible safeguards to be employed include: proper
decision making criteria (for example including all
appropriate factors and changing them as circumstances
warrant) , avoiding logic errors caused by an invalid
translation of requirements between user and programmer,
including a complete edit check for determining complete
input data (this includes for instance a check for blank
data fields leading to incomplete information) , establishing
standards and criteria for programming documentation.
In a study conducted by the Government Accounting Office
(GAO) , the following software problems were researched.
They are quoted as possible areas of improvement for more
effective control in implementing privacy legislation.
1. Adequate communication between the parties to
software design.
2. Incorrect perceptions of the nature of actual
transactions to be processed.
3. Inadequate documentation preventing adequate reviews
of software.
4. Time constraints hampering the effectiveness of the
design process.
5. Absence of written criteria or guidelines for
designers to follow.
6. Detail and complexity involved in designing, coding,
and reviewing software




8. Undetected changes in circumstances making the
application obsolete.
9. State of the act of program testing which prevents
testing all possible conditions. [22]
Certain solutions have been proposed to assist in the
elimination of these sources of error. It is noted that
with today's technology, completely error-free software
cannot be designed, however the probability of inaccurate
documentation can be reduced through implementation of
applicable procedures.
"-Documentation should be prepared that highlights (1)
key portions of the automated decisionmaking criteria, (2)
data elements that are critical to the decisionmaking, and
(3) the edit checks placed (or justifications for omitting
them) in the software. A formalized synopsis of these items
should be prepared for review and approval by top
management.
-Qualified auditors or others who are independent of
designers and users should review the designed application
before it is placed into operation. Others could include a
design team independent of the original designer and user.
They would be responsible for evaluating the (1) adequacy of
the decisionmaking criteria, (2) logic in the coded
application, and (3) needs and uses of edit checks to detect
incomplete data elements put into the application.
-Similar independent teams should review the operation
of these applications shortly after they are implemented.
The objectives would be to evaluate the adequacy of the
decisionmaking criteria in an operational environment and to
provide fcr early detection of any bad decisions. This
would allow for early correction of problems.
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-Some form of cyclical system monitoring of actions
initiated by operational automated decisionmaking
applications should exist. Teams composed of (but not
restricted to ) designers, users, and auditors could analyse
application-initiated actions to (1) see if desired results
were achieved in the best way, (2) identify unforeseen
circumstances that would require modifying the application,
(3) determine that the actions were as the user and designer
intended, and (4) insure that decisionmaking was not
adversely affected by incomplete data not being screened by
an edit check.
-The designer and user should be physically located in
the same place during design phases to allow for constant
communication. In effect, the design would be a joint
effort and would help to insure that adequate decisionmaking
criteria were contained in the application.
-Priorities should be established for software
modification (changes) which are at least partially based on
the cost of continuing incorrect automatic actions if no
changes are made within a short time.
-The initiator of the needed software modification (for
example, headquarters, user, audit team and/or others)
should be informed about the status of the change and be
provided with confirmation that the changes have been made."
[22]
E. COST IMPLICATIONS
"The cost of increased overhead created by additional
checking verification should not be greater than the value
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of the resources being protected or the use of a secure
system will be deterred." [24]
The aspects of determining the cost of privacy include
tangible and intangible factors. Past research has not
accumulated a significant amount of statistical information
on the subject and therefore concrete totals in time,
manhours expended and money are not readily available to the
general public. The tangible cost factors include the
number of data subjects who will make inquires, the amount
of executive personnel time necessary to handle data
disputes, programming time to develop software to handle
Privacy Act requirements and personnel training. There are
three major facets of cost. Legitimate costs include
conversion and operating costs. The third is improper costs
or those items or procedures which have been planned
previously, but are now mandatory and are charged to privacy
legislation. Examples include installing more physical
security hardware, purging or destroying obsolete data,
installing a new data management system, or no longer
collecting more personal information than is required. It
is also conceivable that organizations may charge the
privacy budget with miscellaneous expenses such as changing
programs or re-converting application systems.
The National Bureau of Standards has published "A
Computer Model to Determine Low Cost Techniques to Comply
with the Privacy Act of 1974" which was developed by
Goldstein and Seward. [25, 42] The legitimate costs of
privacy are portrayed in this model. This report, however,
warns of using the figures in specific cases since the
factors influence each agency in specific degrees. The
elements used in the model are applicable to many agencies.
however, it is left to the discretion of each individual
installation to determine to what degree each factor affects
their total cost and which elements may or may not be
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applicable cr are not included in the model. The twenty
compliance steps (techniques) analysed by the model fall
into four general categories :
1. Subject Access Requirements
2. Subject Control Requirements
3. Data Usage Requirements
4. Operating Procedure Requirements
To provide clarity, the variable names used as input to
the model are in parenthesis after each compliance step.
1. Subject Access Requirements
A. Notify each subject of the existence and content
of his record.
(Record existence notification)
B. Respond to inquiries from data subjects
concerning the existence and content of their records.
(Record existence inquiry)
C. Respond to inquiries from data subjects
concerning the uses of their records.
(Record uses inquiry)
D. Respond to complaints from data subjects
concerning the accuracy of their records.
(Data accuracy inquiry)
2. Subject Control Requirements
A. Notify each subject whether he is obligated to
provide data.
(Data supply obligation notification)
E. Obtain the consent of the data subject for each
use of the data.
(Consent for additional use)
C. Obtain the consent of the data subject before
transferring data to a less protected system.
(Consent to transfer data)
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3. Data Usage Requirements
A. Check the authorization of each request for
data.
( Check usage authorization)
B. Maintain a log of all accesses to personal data.
(Usage log maintenance)
C. Include the data subject's statement with any
release of disputed data.
(Subject claim dissemination)
D. Send the subject's statement to all past
recipients of disputed data.
(Retroactive claim dissemination)
E. Assure that any system to which data is
transmitted will provide adequate protection.
(Record transmission)
F. Notify the subject before data is released in
compliance with legal process.
(Legal process notification)
4. Operating Procedure Requirements
A. Assure the accuracy and completeness of all
records.
(Data accuracy)
B. Include any additional data needed to give a
fair picture.
(Additional data)
C. Store a subject's statement of dispute with his
record.
(Subject claim storage)
D. Protect against threats and hazards to the
security of the data.
(Physical security)





F. Assure that his system meets all of the
requirements.
(System assurance)
G. Publish a description of his system where it
will be seen by most data subjects.
(Public notice)
The model then requires a determination of the value of
various attributes which describe a personal data system.
In all, seventy-five pieces of data are required. Examples
are the size of the data base, volume of transactions, and
the number and types of users. These factors are also used
to determine whether a system has on-line capability and if
a data management package is used. Certain attributes are
matched with the regulatory requirements in a matrix format.
These are then analysed to produce two output formats
(reports) . "The first level of output from the model
consists of estimates of the incremental amounts of various
resources needed to meet each requirement. Incremental
resource demands are calculated in order to provide an
indication of what new costs would be incurred specifically
because of the privacy legislation, and to avoid the
probably insolvable problem of deciding what share of
certain costs should be attributable to privacy, and what to
other objectives. The impact model also distinguishes
between conversion costs which are incurred only once to
bring a system into compliance with the regulations, and
ongoing costs which must be added to ' preprivacy 1 operating
costs." [25]
Conversion (nonrecurring) cost factors include physical
security, operator and user training in privacy-oriented
procedures, and programming required to develop
legislatively mandatory capabilities. This is the first




Types of ongoing costs encompass maintaining an
accurate data base and handling complaints and inquiries
from data subjects. (The second section of the output
consists of these expenses.) It is suggested the reports be
placed side-by-side for most efficient analysis. "The
general resource categories which are consid' red are:
manpower, data storage, information processing, data
communications, and capital (which includes various items of
equipment and supplies). Each of these categories is broken
down into several subdivisions." [25]
The model uses the following headers respectively:
administration, storage, processing, data transmission, and
capital. Additionally, the number of programming man-hours
is listed.
"Once the resource demands of each requirement have
been computed, they are converted to money amounts using
factors appropriate 'for the specific installation, and are
then aggregrated by resource and by requirement. This
enables the quick identification of high-cost requirements
and of resource areas experiencing heavy demands." [25]
It is obvious that not all data bank systems will
encounter the same level of conversion and ongoing costs.
The data banks with information already publically available
or of low sensitivety need to implement features that
guarantee data integrity and prevent user interference with
each other. More sensitive information in on-line, shared
and integrated data bank systems, however, may require the
installation of all known protection features.
Certain conclusions reached by Goldstein about relative
costs are worth noting. With reguard to conversion costs,
three areas were expensive. The first is the cost cf new
forms which should include a notification of the riahts of
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the data subject when providing information or. the form;
second, the cost of installing a "satisfactory" physical
security system; and third, employee training in the use of
new procedures. In some instances programming significantly
increases the cost of conforming to legislation. (Goldstein
suggests using general data base management packages to
decrease conversion costs)
.
Under the category of operating costs, the most
expensive areas were; searching a file for the records of
those individuals who inquire about the data in the record
and which organizations have the record and the executive
personnel time required to process data subject's complaints
about the accuracy of their records. The findings of the
study by Goldstein are still preliminary and in some
instances his conclusions are not surprising. Until this
model is used with other types of computer installations, it





The privacy issue is extremely complex in nature. The
proper balance of protecting individual rights through
management procedures, data considerations, and security
measures is needed to insure compliance with legislation.
This reevaluation of current systems and technology is
intended to bring out important factors in maintaining
compliance with legislation. To achieve the proper balance
between the right of the individual and the ' rights of
industry and government with regard to personal information
is the ultimate ideal goal.
Insuring individual privacy protection extends from the
state level to beyond a country's physical geographical
border. [11,52] The nine Common Market countries have
recognized the need for standard legislation en the
international scale as is evidenced by the survey currently
being conducted by the Commission of the European
Communities. [11] One important fact is that the dara
processed in each country is not legally protected once it
is outside its borders. The issue is yet to be resolved in
the United States of America and Canada. It could have an
enormous impact on private industry if H.R. 1984 becomes a
law.
The questions concerning management of personal
information still to be resolved are most importantly (1) if
the computer installation personnel have implemented all
possible measures through administrative, training and
security procedures to protect an individual's personal data
and the personal data is still obtained by unauthorized
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means, who is responsible and liable for legal penalties?
(2) if the 'state of the art 1 technology is yet to solve the
problem of a completely secure automated system, is the
computer industry legally responsible for personal data
obtained through currently unsolvable technological methods?
and (3) to what extent should the computer manager implement
procedures to insure that privacy legislation is complied
with?
Data accuracy can best be achieved through input
validation procedures. If however, that data is inaccurate
due to improper entry by the individual who is the subject
of that data, then who is legally responsible? Again, a
relationship of trust must be reinforced between the data
subject and the computer industry. Legally, the industry is
not covered and unless they establish some protection
procedures, a lawsuit could result.
The problems associated with hardware lie mainly with
the telecommunication systems (electronic emanations) and
older computer systems which do not have all the internal
security checks and protection mechanisms that are in the
third-generation systems. With regard to electronic
emanations, it is the researchers who must solve this
problem. As for older computer systems, if computer
installations have to change equipment to comply with
legislation, it would be costly.
One major problem is the compatability of "legal
records" with "computer records". Legally, the term record
could mean only a part of a computer record. This means
reorganizing files and a new method of structuring data must
be achieved. The complication of having a variety of data
sensitivity levels in a computer record can be costly to the
computer installation. the issue is even more complex with
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the requirement to retrieve all data held on a data subject
should the ir.dividual request it.
The data structure problem is both hardware and software
connected. Limitations exist in the physical storage
capacity of the equipment and the programs utilized in the
processing of the data must be reevaluated for possible
modification to a new system. Software auditing procedures
must be implemented to insure unauthorized access is not
possible, as well as unintentional modification of data.
The cost of implementing privacy legislation has been
analysed by Goldstein and Seward. Although it has only been
used on a few types of systems (internal, financial, and
governmental) the results are promising. The Purdue
Information Privacy Research Center is currently conducting
research on the economic impact of privacy. [17] The results
of this study should be of great value to the computer
industry
.
This discussion has mentioned various procedures,
technological and administrative, to be implemented in
regard to decreasing unauthorized a.ccess and increasing data
accuracy as is required by the privacy legislation in effect
today. It is not intended to cover all areas of the privacy
situation nor answer all questions. It is intended to
emphasize major considerations faced by the computer
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